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The  comment  on  my invited  address  to the
Western  Agricultural  Economics  Association
annual  meeting  in  1988  is  well  received.  It,
once again, highlights the key issues surround-
ing  the  controversy  over  the  structure,  con-
duct,  and  performance  of  the  world-grain
economy.  I would like to begin by responding
to Martin, Lev, and Emami's concluding para-
graph.  I have never been  an advocate  for the
creation of grain cartels any more than I have
been  an  advocate  of  stopping  agricultural
mechanization  in  California.  When  I  first
joined  the  profession  and  wrote  along  with
Professor  Seckler,  "Mechanized  Agriculture
and Social  Welfare:  The Case  of the Tomato
Harvester,"  the purpose  was to point out the
consequences  of adopting  the mechanical  to-
mato harvester.  We did not assert whether or
not it should be  adopted.  In  my writings  on
the world-grain  trade,  I have taken the same
position:  that of being  a nonadvocate.  How-
ever,  while not being an advocate  of grain ex-
port cartels, my work and that of  my colleagues
draw attention to how bad agricultural  policy
is in many parts of the world. While the com-
ment  seems  to  suggest  that  a  grain  cartel  is
impossible, I hope that the authors do not sug-
gest that the current trading regime is optimal.
My position is not too dissimilar from that of
Professor  D.  Gale  Johnson  who  argues  that
agriculture  is in disarray.  The difference,  per-
haps,  lies  in the solution  of how to get  agri-
culture out of disarray.
I will deal specifically with the points raised
by Martin, Lev, and Emami. I have heard these
arguments  many  times  when  presenting  lec-
tures  about  how to  restructure  the  interna-
tional agricultural policy and grain trade. Their
first point centers on the excess-demand curve
facing wheat exporters. Clearly, there is no sin-
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gle  excess-demand  curve  for  wheat  since  a
proper  specification  suggests  that  the  price
elasticity will depend on the quality of wheat
exported  and  the  nature  of the  country  im-
porting  wheat.  The elasticities  are  a function
of  such factors as income levels and grain qual-
ity.
I have never been able to conceptually  de-
rive (given the large policy distortions that ex-
ist) a "distorted" excess-demand curve for ma-
jor traded commodities such as wheat. Because
of the theoretical problems, there is little won-
der that the empirical estimates on excess-de-
mand curves vary greatly.  What do these es-
timates mean?  It is very easy to conceptually
derive an excess-demand curve under perfectly
competitive  conditions.  In that  case,  Martin,
Lev, and Emami are right that the price elas-
ticity  at a given price  has to be  more  elastic
for the excess-demand  curve than for the in-
ternal-demand  curve.  However,  in  the  real
world,  one  does not have competitive condi-
tions;  therefore,  if one  can  derive  an excess-
demand  curve,  it  is  certainly  not  a  smooth
function  as  would  be  the  case if a perfectly
competitive  environment  existed.  In  this re-
gard,  I would once again highlight,  for exam-
ple,  the Japanese  case.  I have  published this
example  elsewhere  (Carter,  McCalla,  and
Schmitz;  Schmitz).  The  import  demand  for
wheat  by the Japanese  is  essentially  vertical
(i.e., highly price inelastic). This is because there
are several internal prices for Japanese  wheat
which bear no resemblance to the import price.
The Japanese  Food Agency imports wheat at
one price, but the prices paid to producers and
that paid by the millers are significantly above
the import price. Our numbers show that, when
the United States lowered  the loan rate under
the 1985 Farm Bill, there were significant gains
to the Japanese Food Agency since they merely
purchased  wheat at  a  lower  price.  However,
the  price  paid by millers did not change  nor
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did the price received  by producers in Japan.
In this case, it has always been inconceivable
to me, at least, how the import-demand curve
for wheat by the Japanese  could be price elas-
tic. One  could go  on  and on  and make  such
arguments  for  importers  of wheat.  In  all  of
these cases, the elasticity  is largely  a function
of the degree  of domestic  distortions.  Gener-
ally, the more pronounced the distortions, the
greater  would be  the inelasticity  of demand,
although I have worked out certain cases where
the  opposite would  be the  case.  The bottom
line  of this argument  is that one  cannot  use
results  derived  from  perfectly  competitive
conditions  to show what would happen if one
changed agricultural and trade policy in a ma-
jor way.
Also, in the above context, we are very clear
in much of our work that one really does not
talk  about  a  uniform  price  that  would  be
charged to all importers. Certainly, clever mar-
keters would charge different prices depending
on price elasticities. We make it very clear that
in highly inelastic markets, one charges a much
higher price than in the price-elastic  markets;
and  certainly  this  is  consistent  with  theory.
Therefore, under a cartel arrangement, the price
charged to Japan,  for example,  would be sig-
nificantly  higher than those prices charged to
less-developed  countries.  In  this  regard,  one
can  also  avoid  the  reshipment  issue  that  is
often  raised  concerning  cartel  arrangements.
Therefore, even though one may find that cer-
tain  countries  have  elastic  excess-demand
curves for imported wheat, one should not in-
fer that all countries have such schedules.  Re-
lated to this, I  learned several years  ago  how
certain  pricing  arrangements  occur  in  areas
covering fruits and vegetables.  For example,  a
world-renowned  cooperative  located  in Cali-
fornia  charges  different  prices  for  a homoge-
neous product. It would charge a much higher
price for its commodity in Californian and Ca-
nadian markets than it did in markets such as
Poland. The price differences were much great-
er than transportation  costs  and other  trans-
action costs.
In analyzing the world-grain  trade,  one ap-
preciates  that various  qualities  of wheat  are
involved and prices range according to quality.
We (Ulrich, Furtan, and Schmitz) demonstrat-
ed that  the introduction  of high-yielding  va-
rieties in Canada would certainly  be a plus to
producers.  Part  of this  argument is based  on
the  notion  that the  demand  for high-quality
wheat is highly price inelastic and that a certain
percentage  of  the  world  wheat  economy  is
highly dependent on high-quality wheat, even
though  that  percentage  is  diminishing.  This
merely strengthens the argument that price dis-
crimination  is  desirable  in  the  world-grain
trade.  Price  discrimination  is currently  prac-
ticed with the  U.S. export enhancement  pro-
gram since the  price paid by the Chinese, for
example, is much lower than the price paid by
the  Japanese.  However,  price  discrimination
as currently practiced in the international grain
trade  is extremely  costly because  of its  asso-
ciated  subsidy  element;  cartel-type  arrange-
ments are free of export subsidies.
The second point raised by Martin, Lev, and
Emami concerns supply response by importing
countries due to higher prices. Certainly, there
are many countries in the world that have price
supports now well above the import price for
grains.  As  a  result,  raising  the  world  price
should not have any impact on production re-
sponse in these countries since prices are gen-
erally above free-market prices, e.g., European
Community prices.  Concerning areas such  as
the Soviet Union and China,  it is always  in-
teresting to look back to see what has happened
to production  response  over the past several
years.  One has to recall  that in the  1970s the
real price of wheat generally was at an all-time
high.  However,  one  did not observe  massive
supply  responses  in these  regions.  Also,  it is
interesting to speculate as to what will happen
in the future concerning  technological  change
in the world wheat economy.  I have to agree
that there have been  responses in the past to
price  supports and the like, and to this extent
they are linked to the development and adop-
tion of new varieties.  However, whether  such
new varieties  can be continuously  developed
to obtain the  same  type  of yield  response  as
has happened in the past is an interesting ques-
tion. Also,  it is not clear  how prices influence
research and development and adoption rates.
If one considers a model which includes the
demand for stocks, the problem remains as to
what is the most efficient way of carrying out
business.  Should one lower price and increase
the volume  of export sales while  at the same
time reducing stocks? The answer to this ques-
tion again  depends  on  the nature  of the de-
mand  schedules  confronting  U.S.  and  other
world exporters. As we show in a separate pa-
per  (Babcock,  Carter,  and  Schmitz),  one  can
conceive  of situations where  the gain in total
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revenue  from  lowering  the  loan  rate  as  was
done in 1985 can be actually less than the cost
of storing that quantity.
I have  generally  supported  the notion that
there are  significant  gains from  international
trade in both manufacturing and in agriculture.
All of my arguments in the international grain
markets  have  been  aimed  toward  achieving
this  goal.  Current  policies  have  essentially
driven us to the position where there are very
few gains  from  international  trade  in major
farm products (Schmitz, Sigurdson, and Doer-
ing; Carter and Schmitz).  For there to be gains
from  trade,  distortions  have  to be  removed.
The argument I presented at the Western meet-
ings was merely that, if countries are unwilling
to  give  up internal  price  supports,  then  cer-
tainly production  controls are more desirable
than having all-out production and export sub-
sidies  where  the  importing  nations  are  the
gainers. This is certainly  not a cartel solution
but would be an improvement over the exist-
ing situation. Again,  ideally, one has to move
toward freer trade regimes in agriculture which
is currently the aim under GATT.
Lastly,  somehow the profession seems to be
hung up on the notion that export performance
should  be  measured  using  market-share  cri-
teria.  For example,  if a country  increases  its
market  share  over  time,  then  somehow  its
comparative advantage has improved vis d vis
its competitors.  Clearly,  using such criteria is
a  serious  flaw  since  one  can  easily  increase
market share by the use of the treasury.  If one
supports producers at a price three times higher
than what  the  commodity  is  sold for in  the
international  market  merely  for the  sake  of
either maintaining or increasing market share,
then one  soon realizes  that market-share  cri-
teria  are  bad  measures  of economic  perfor-
mance at least from a macro  viewpoint.
[Received September 1989.]
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